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Despite the expectations of economists that the euro changeover would have
no e®ect on prices, we show that European consumers perceive the contrary.
The data indicate that consumers based their perceptions about in°ation on
goods that are cheaper and more frequently purchased. We use this insight
to develop and estimate a model of imperfect information that explains why
these goods were subject to higher price growth after the changeover. The data
indicate that some retailers, aware of the consumers' di±culties in adopting
the new currency, used the changeover to increase pro¯ts by increasing prices.
We also propose an explanation on why, contrary to common belief, this e®ect
was smaller in more concentrated retail markets.
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On January 1st, 2002, the euro was introduced as a legal tender in 12 countries of the
European Union (EU). Given that the exchange rates between those countries had
been ¯xed three years earlier, when the euro was launched as an electronic currency,
many predicted that the cash changeover would have little e®ect on prices. In fact,
the average in°ation in the eurozone turned out not to be exceptionally high and
the operation was considered a success.
In light of this, it is puzzling that most EU citizens think that the introduction
of the euro had triggered a price increase. Around 70 percent believe that prices
had been rounded up. Figure 1 shows that in the eurozone, perceived in°ation
signi¯cantly exceeds actual in°ation in the post-euro period, while that is not true
for the remaining EU countries for which the same data are available, namely, the
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden.
Are most Europeans wrong about in°ation, or did the euro have some e®ect on
prices? The main aim of this paper is to show that the changeover had contributed
to in°ation and to explain why this has not been observed in the aggregated data.
We propose a model in which consumers are rational, but have di±culty dealing
with prices after a cash changeover. A new currency decreases the transparency of
prices, hindering price comparisons. That weakens competition between retailers.
Small di®erences in price levels are not perfectly observable. Imperfect observability
generates incentives to increase prices and it decreases the incentive to undercut
competitor's price. Therefore, the equilibrium price is higher after the changeover,
even in competitive markets. Incentives to increase prices do not depend on the
initial price level hence euro-related in°ation is inversely proportional to the initial
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Figure 1: Di®erence between perceived and actual in°ation (in percent). Perceived in-
°ation is based on di®erences between positive and negative opinions about the level of
in°ation. To make the two series comparable both indices have been standardized. Source:
Authors' calculations based on the EU Business and Consumer Surveys and on Eurostat
data.
of in°ation is likely to be based on the prices of cheaper, more frequently bought
goods1, the currency changeover generates a divergence between perceived and ac-
tual in°ation.
Within the model, we analyze how the e®ect of the euro introduction depends
upon the market structure. We assume that retailers can improve consumers' price
perception by investing in transparency-enhancing measures, such as advertising,
dual pricing, explicit cross-shop comparisons, etc. If transparency increases, con-
sumers are more likely to notice shops that lower their prices. Lowering the price
may result in higher pro¯t if enough consumers will perceive this price correctly.
Transparency-enhancing investment is costly, therefore it will be undertaken only
1See also Guiso (2003) and Del Giovane and Sabbatini (2004).
3by shops that bene¯t from it the most. In our model these are the shops that oper-
ate in a relatively concentrated market. Contrary to standard competitive models,
we ¯nd that higher market concentration leads to lower euro-related in°ation.
We found anecdotal evidence supporting our model. On their website, Carrefour,
the leading retailer in 6 of the 12 euro countries, and the second largest retailer in
the world, states \Mission Euro, Mission Accomplished!":
\As a major retailer, Carrefour played a key role in the success of
the historic changeover to the euro. The fact is that customers relied on
the Group's banners to welcome them just as warmly as on any other
day, make their task easier, assist them to ¯nd their way around the new
system, and answer their queries."
Carrefour was also committed to \[...] 2. coach everyone in the euro by learning
the new value of products together; 3. no price increases during the months of the
changeover period (apart from normal seasonal variations)2; 4. rounding up [sic!]
prices in a way that ensures no price increases for the customer; [...]; 6. putting
exceptional measures in place to assist all its customers during the changeover to
the euro; 7. continuing to clearly display prices in both currencies for a minimum of
6 months." Unless we believe that Carrefour was motivated by benevolent intensions,
all these strategies were likely to be pro¯t-maximizing.
We ¯nd strong support for our model in the data. First, we analyze self-reported
attitudes toward the euro, using the Eurobarometer survey. We ¯nd that many EU
citizens had problems dealing with the new currency. Among other things, when
shopping they thought in terms of the old currency, felt a need for dual pricing, and
had problems with remembering and comparing prices.
2Carrefour in Belgium, for example, froze prices from November 15, 2001, through March 15,
2002.
4Second, we analyze the relationship between in°ation and price levels. Using the
data for individual products, we provide strong evidence that after the introduction
of the euro, cheaper products experienced higher in°ation. Using di®erence-in-
di®erence estimation, we show that this is not true for EU countries that did not
introduce the euro.
We regress the e®ect that we ¯nd using the parametric speci¯cation on country-
speci¯c measures of di±culties in dealing with new currency and on market con-
centration. For a given market concentration, countries whose citizens report more
problems with new currency have higher in°ation for cheap goods. Finally, con-
sistent with our model, we ¯nd a very strong negative correlation between market
concentration and in°ation.
The layout of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we present a short overview
of the literature. In Section 3 we outline the formal model. Section 4 summarizes
the evidence that consumers experienced di±culty dealing with new currency. In
Section 5 we test the model. Section 6 concludes. The data are described in the
Appendix.
2 Related literature
The introduction of the euro has attracted a fair amount of research. Much of the
literature on this topic has focused on the restoration sector, which experienced a
very high in°ation in 2002. Hobijn, Ravenna and Tambalotti (2004) and Gaiotti and
Lippi (2005) assume that prices are adjusted periodically due to menu cost. They
argue that as a result of currency changeover restaurants were forced to incur those
5costs at the same time, therefore they all adjusted prices at the same time3. This
generated a spike in in°ation. Additionally, menu costs were incorporated in prices
at the time of the changeover, and that contributed further to in°ation. While this
assumption may hold for restaurants, a survey among businesses organized by the
National Bank of Belgium shows that 83 percent of the cost related to the changeover
was born and was loaded on prices before the changeover (NBB 2002). Even for
retail trade, where one might expect less planning, 73 percent of the costs were
transferred to consumers before January 2002. Although menu costs have certainly
contributed to in°ation, these papers do not seem to provide a complete description
of the euro e®ect. In particular, they do not explain the relation between in°ation
and the euro-related di±culty consumers reported.
Adriani et al. (2003) propose a model, where consumers are either locals or
tourists, and tourists lack any information about the quality of food served by
restaurants. In their model, a simultaneous and coordinated increase in expected
prices may generate a price jump to a higher equilibrium. The model seems to apply
only to restaurants, while most Europeans perceived that after the changeover small
retailers increased prices as much as restaurants (Table 1).
There also have been some attempts to explain the di®erence between perceived
and actual in°ation. It has been argued that one possible reason for the gap is
that consumers may have simply used approximated exchange rates. In Italy, for
example, the exchange rate is 1,936.27 lire for one euro. If consumers use an exchange
rate of 2,000, this can bias perceived in°ation by about 3 percent. If this explanation
were true, some euro countries should have experienced a decrease in perceived
in°ation because the rounding worked in the opposite direction. Table 2 shows that
3Hobijn, Ravenna and Tambalotti use Eurostat's month-to-month in°ation (HICP) for restau-
rants and cafes, while Gaiotti and Lippi use Italian data taken from a restaurant guide book
6Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium contradict this idea; they have a positive
rounding error, and yet had a big, positive gap between perceived and actual price
growth.
Apart from analyzing the currency changeover, our paper contributes to the
literature on competition with imperfect information. There are many models of
consumer behavior that attempt to capture the implications of costly information
for price determination, but it has been di±cult to provide convincing empirical tests
for them. Diamond (1971), in a very in°uential paper, shows that even small search
costs could result in noncompetitive outcomes. In another theoretical paper, Salop
and Stiglitz (1977) assume that consumers have heterogenous costs of gathering
information. This assumption can generate an equilibrium with price dispersion,
but Diamond's unique monopoly-price equilibrium may still hold when there are
high enough information costs. Braverman (1980) generalizes the former model,
allowing for U-shaped cost functions and a continuous distribution of the cost of
information.
In order to test these models, starting with the seminal paper by Pratt, Wise and
Zeckhauser (1979), empirical work has mainly tried to measure the price dispersion
that is not due to product di®erentiation. Many recent papers have tried to measure
if the introduction of the internet, which considerably reduces search costs, reduces
price dispersion (see, for example, Baylis and Perlo® 2002).
73 Model of price competition under limited price
transparency
3.1 Uniform market
There are N shops selling an identical product at a constant marginal cost c. Shops
compete in Bertrand fashion.
There is a continuum of consumers of measure one. Each consumer buys one
unit of the good, and tries to minimize the price spent on it. If all shops charge
the same price, consumers are uniformly distributed among them. Each consumer
knows the distribution of the prices on the market, but does not know the location4,
i.e., she does not know which shop charges which price from the distribution. She
can ¯nd out the location by searching, which is costless.
Initially, all prices are expressed in the old currency, call it lire. Clearly, in
equilibrium p = c, and consumers are indi®erent between shops.
Introduction of a new currency a®ects the consumer's perception of prices. She
knows the distribution of the prices in lire and does not know the location of prices.
In every shop she visits, she observes the price in euro, but has di±culties converting
it to lire in order to determine which price from the distribution she is facing.
Additionally, she has a hard time remembering and comparing prices in euro. The
problem with price perception is modeled in the following way. If there are two
di®erent prices on the market,5 say p and ^ p, the consumer enters the shop, observes
the price in euro, and gets a noisy signal about the corresponding value in lire. The
signal may be H or L. Signal H suggests that a given shop charges the higher of
4Like in Salop and Stiglitz (1977).
5For our analysis it is enough to model price perception for situations with only two distinct
prices in the market.
8p and ^ p, and signal L suggests that the price is the lower one. After observing the
signal, the consumer decides whether to buy the good in the shop or not. If she does
not buy the good, she goes to another shop, where she gets a new signal. Signals
are independent across shops and consumers.
The signal's precision depends upon the di®erence between p and ^ p. If ^ p is very
di®erent from p, then price ^ p expressed in euro will be rarely mistaken for price
p. This is captured by the function q(d), where d is the distance between the two
prices. Let q (^ p ¡ p) be the probability of getting signal L in a shop that charges
the euro equivalent of price p, when some other shop charges ^ p. We set q(0) = 1
2,
which means that identical prices are indistinguishable. Also, q(¢) 2 [0;1], and
q(^ p ¡ p) = 1 ¡ q (p ¡ ^ p), i.e., the probability of getting signal L in shop charging
p is equal to the probability of getting signal H in a shop charging ^ p. We assume
q0 =
dq(^ p¡p)
d^ p = ¡
dq(^ p¡p)
dp > 0; that is, increasing the distance between prices leads
to a lower probability of mistake. q0(0) measures how distinguishable prices are. If
q0(0) = 1, there is perfect price perception.6
The consumer observes only the signals, therefore she conditions her decision
solely on them. Since the probability that a given shop charges a lower price is
higher if L is observed, she buys the good in the ¯rst shop in which she observes L.
If she never observes L, she is indi®erent between all shops, and we assume that she
buys the good in the last visited shop.
Let ^ p be the price on the market, once the new currency is introduced. For ^ p
to be an equilibrium, we need that no shop has an incentive to deviate by charging
6We believe that this a good approximation of a more complicated model in which perception
of the price is ~ p = p + "; where p price in Lire. Consumers get a noisy estimate of p, upon seeing
p¤ = pe in euro. e is the exchange rate. In such a model consumer chooses the shop with the
smallest realization of ~ p. Also, it su±ces to specify the signal structure for two prices on the
market, as we will use a Nash equilibrium concept and consider deviation by a single shop.
9a di®erent price. Consider a representative shop, call it shop 1. Shop 1 can raise
its price, increasing its pro¯t per customer but losing some of its initial customers
who get signal H. Alternatively, it may decrease its price, decreasing its pro¯t per
customer but capturing new consumers. Charging p 6= ^ p, shop 1 will retain its
customers who get signal L, will capture all consumers who get H before reaching
shop 1, and L in shop 1 and will get all consumers, who reach shop 1 at the end.
Therefore, the number of consumers served by shop 1 at price p is7














q (^ p ¡ p) + (q (^ p ¡ p))
N¡1 ¡ 2(q (^ p ¡ p))
N
1 ¡ q (^ p ¡ p)
: (1)
Pro¯ts of shop 1 are
¦(p; ^ p) = x(p; ^ p)(p ¡ c):
The ¯rst order condition is
d¦
dp
= x(p; ^ p) +
dx(p; ^ p)
dp
(p ¡ c) = 0: (2)
As all ¯rms are identical in equilibrium, the FOC must be satis¯ed for p = ^ p.
Evaluating the FOC at ^ p, we get the formula for the equilibrium price









7We assume that consumers uniformly search all shops, that is, consumers who leave shop 1 go















We can state the following proposition:
Proposition 1. In°ation is inversely proportional to the initial price and to price
transparency. It is decreasing with the degree of competition.
After the introduction of a new currency, shops try to exploit the imperfect price
perception and increase prices, as the increase in price per customer is not entirely
o®set by the loss of customers. If price perception is perfect, q0 (0) = 1, we have
p = c as before.
3.2 Market concentration
We introduce the possibility of investing in transparency-enhancing measures, such
as advertising, explicit cross-price comparison, double pricing etc. Let ®i be the level
of transparency-enhancing investment by shop i and ® = 1
N
P
i ®i be the average
level of investment in the market. Price transparency may vary across shops, and
depends on the price di®erence, as before, but also on the average level of investment
and on the relative investment of a given shop. Let q(®;
®i
® ; ^ p¡p) be the probability of
receiving signal L in a shop charging p and investing ®i, when the average investment
is ®. We assume that the transparency of prices in every shop is higher, the higher
the average investment is: @
@d@®q(®;
®i
® ;0) = q0
1(®;
®i







because if all shops make identical investment and charge identical price they should
attract an identical number of consumers (q (®;1;0) = 1
2 for all ®). Additionally,
other things equal, consumers in shops with higher investment relative to the market






> 0: The last assumption
11means that consumers prefer shops with higher transparency even if d = ^ p ¡ p = 0.
The cost of investment is C (®i), where C0 > 0 and C00 > 0. Every shop sets price



















be the number of consumers captured by a
shop with investment ®i and price p when other shops invest ®j, and charge price
^ p. We can show that









































(p ¡ c) ¡ C (®i):



















(p ¡ c) ¡ C
0 (®i) = 0:




























(^ p ¡ c) ¡ C
0 (®i) = 0: (5)
12From equation (4) we get that











0 (®) = 0:
Using the implicit function theorem, we get the formula for the derivative of invest-






1 (®;1;0)C0 (®) + q0 (®;1;0)C00 (®))
< 0:













































In particular, for any set of parameters there exists ¹ N such that for all N > ¹ N © is
positive.
For example, for q = 1
2
®i






13ln2 > 0 for N ¸ 4:
De¯ne market concentration as the size of an average shop, ´ = 1
N. It follows that
if market concentration is not big enough, the post-changeover price is decreasing
in market concentration. Investment in transparency-enhancing measures is more
pro¯table if it results in much higher demand. A small investment, together with a
small price decrease, results in higher demand in more concentrated markets.
4 Consumers' attitude toward the euro
To measure consumers' attitudes toward the euro we use the data from the Euro-
barometer survey conducted in 2002. The data are summarized in Table 3.
A signi¯cant fraction of Europeans reported having problems dealing with the
euro. When asked how di±cult it is to remember or to compare prices in euro,
around 40 percent said it was either fairly (30 percent) or very (10 percent) di±cult.
Around 20 percent said they were uncomfortable with the euro. Seven percent (Ire-
land) to 28 percent (France) were highly pessimistic, and believed these di±culties
to be permanent. Four months after the introduction of the euro, the majority said
they always, or often, thought in terms of their old currency and tried to convert
the prices. We believe that thinking in terms of old currency and the need to con-
vert suggest lower price transparency q0. Converting prices for every good leads
to rounding mistakes, making some prices hardly distinguishable. Only around 10
percent of Europeans said that dual pricing had been useless, while a quarter said
it was essential. This suggests that prices given in euro were not very transparent.
Only from 6 percent (France) to 23 percent (Greece) of the consumers looked solely
at the price in euro when both prices were available.
The attitude toward the euro di®ered across countries. It is interesting that
14countries that used to have a strong currency and have strong national identities,
such as Germany and France, had a higher fraction of people saying they were not
pleased with the euro. On the other hand, the two \most European" countries, the
ones that also host most of the European institutions, Belgium and Luxembourg,
were the least hostile toward the new currency.
The di®erences in the distribution of age and education were another reason why
the attitudes toward the euro varied across countries. Problems with the euro were
mainly experienced by older, and less educated people. Among consumers older
than 64 the numbers reported in Table 3 are approximately double as big. Notice
that Ireland, which has, by far, the youngest population in Europe, had the lowest
fraction of people admitting to having di±culties comparing and remembering prices
in euro. High fractions of consumers also had a hard time dealing with the newly
introduced coins, and again, the numbers are doubled if we restrict the sample to
older consumers.8
In order to capture the relationship between years of education, age, and euro
related variables, Table 4 shows the estimated coe±cients of an ordinary least-square
regression (OLS), when education and then age are used as the dependent variables.
Di±culties dealing with the euro are good predictors for age and level of education.
Older consumers and consumers with fewer years of education are more likely to
feel uncomfortable with the euro. They have more problems when dealing with new
coins, and it is more di±cult for them to remember and to compare prices. They
are more likely to say that dual pricing is essential. The need to convert is the only
variable that shows a positive and strong relationship with respect to age, while not
showing any relationship with respect to education.
8Many European countries did not have coins of reasonable value before the changeover.
15The country ¯xed e®ects are included in Table 3 to remind us that countries
such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain tend to have lower levels of education,
and that the average age is higher in Italy and Greece.
5 Econometric Framework
5.1 Speci¯cation
The main prediction of our model that we want to test is that the euro-related
in°ation was inversely proportional to prices.
Figure 2 provides a glimpse of what we ¯nd. It shows the di®erence between euro
and non-euro countries in the di®erence between post-euro and pre-euro demeaned
and deseasonalized annual in°ation rates. This di®erence-in-di®erence is plotted
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Figure 2: First panel: Di®erence-in-di®erences in annual in°ation rates (demeaned and
deseasonalized). The ¯rst di®erence is between euro-countries and non-euro countries (the
United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden), the second di®erence is between 1 year post-
euro and 5 year pre-euro in°ation. In the second panel the euro countries include only
Italy, Spain and Greece. The quintile cuto®s are 3, 8, 19 and 100 euros. Source: Author's
calculations using Economist Intelligence Unit and Eurostat data (Appendix A)
When we restrict the analysis to the three euro countries with the lowest degree of
16retailer concentration, Italy, Spain, and Greece, the di®erence-in-di®erence for the
¯rst price quintile is almost twice as big.
First, we want to test the prediction of equation (3). We want to see how price
levels a®ected in°ation in the period before the introduction of the euro and after,
and compare that to the relation between in°ation and price levels in EU countries

































c denotes a country, j a product, and t time. The indicator function 1(t ¸ 2002)
is 1 for observations after January 2002, and 0 otherwise. ¯c
0 measures the aver-
age pre-euro impact of the inverse of price on in°ation. ¯c






N¡1 and measures how in°ation was a®ected by the euro. A country-
speci¯c ¯xed e®ect °c
1 is added to measure any changeover e®ect that is unrelated
to price levels. Equation (8) speci¯es that the impact of the inverse of price level
on in°ation depends upon the transparency of prices after the changeover, and on
a product of this transparency and market concentration.
We estimate equation (7) by country to allow for di®erences due to exchange
rates, institutions, market structures, etc. We use Eurostat item-speci¯c in°ation,
and in order to recover information about price levels, we match these data with the
Economist Intelligence Unit data (see Appendix A). Although in°ation is measured
as the annual percentage price change,9 and therefore already captures seasonality,
9In a previous version of the paper the same analysis has been carried out using monthly price
changes, yielding similar results (Mastrobuoni 2004).
17for each country and each item we additionally control for any residual time-invariant
seasonality by projecting in°ation on 12 monthly dummies. We also detrend all item-
speci¯c price indices by demeaning their in°ation rates over the observed six-year
period (01/1997 - 12/2002).
We use the estimates of ¯c
1 from the ¯rst regression to estimate equation (8).
The three non-euro countries (the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark) serve
as a comparison. In our model higher q0 means higher price transparency, therefore
1
q0 will be approximated by measures of di±culties dealing with euro reported in
the Eurobarometer survey. As a measure for ´, we use the market share of the ¯ve
leading retailers in the food industry (see Appendix A).
If we believe that all EU countries are subject to the same price shocks, then in
order to identify the e®ect of the euro introduction we need to adjust ¯c
1 for the euro
countries by subtracting the corresponding ¯c
1 of the non-euro countries. Below,
we show a supporting evidence that the non-euro EU countries may be a good
comparison group, as their in°ation patterns by price levels are similar. We use a
di®erence in di®erence (D-D) estimator. The euro countries represent a treatment
group (T), while all non-euro EU countries represent the control group (C). Let
T = 1 if a country belongs to the treatment group, and T = 0 otherwise. We
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1(t ¸ 2002)T + ~ e
c
j;t : (9)
In this speci¯cation, the e®ects of the changeover are assumed to be constant after
10Notice that the OLS and the D-D estimates should di®er across countries by just a constant.
The reason why this is not always the case is that the panel is not perfectly balanced.
18the introduction of the euro. In reality, the results vary with time, and the ¯rst
e®ects of the euro introduction might have occurred a few months after January
2002, if retailers needed some time to discover the consumers' di±culties, and might
have decreased afterward, when consumers gradually overcame these di±culties.11
We also estimate a version of equation (9) that allows for the euro e®ect to vary
over time.
All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares, and standard errors
allow for heterogeneity over time and goods, and dependence over goods. This is
done by clustering the 46 product-items into 13 di®erent homogenous groups (see
Appendix A).
5.2 Results
The estimates of equation (7) are reported in Table 5. The second column shows
the estimates of ¯1, b ¯1, when °1 is set to zero.
The non-euro countries have negative estimates for ¯1. This means that in
the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark item-speci¯c in°ation was signi¯cantly
lower for cheaper goods. When we include an after-euro constant term °1, these
countries have b ¯1 close to -2.5 percent. For euro countries b ¯1 is always bigger than -
2.5 percent. Moreover, it is positive and signi¯cant for Spain, Italy and Luxembourg.
Assuming that all EU countries experienced similar exogenous shocks (and we have
shown this seems to be true for Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), we
can use the three non-euro countries as a comparison group, to identify the euro
11Moreover, there was a dual circulation period of two months at the time of the changeover. A
survey of 2,605 businesses in Belgium (NBB 2002) shows that about half of them used dual pricing.
The number goes up to 95 percent for the retail trade. Unfortunately, 60 percent of these retailers
did not know (50 percent), or did not want to answer (10 percent), how long they would keep the
dual pricing. Twenty percent said they would keep it for two months. This simply con¯rms that
it is hard to ¯x a date for the changeover e®ect.
19e®ect.
We estimate equation (9), and report the results in Table 6. The last column
of this table shows the estimate of ¯3. All coe±cients are clearly positive, and all
but one, Ireland, are signi¯cant at the 5 percent level. This strongly suggests that
controlling for exogenous e®ects, the introduction of the euro had a bigger e®ect
on prices of cheaper goods. This e®ect ranges from 0.95 for Ireland, to 4.43 for
Luxembourg.12 What this means, is that a good with a price of one euro had in
Luxembourg, on average, an additional yearly in°ation rate of 4.43 percent. Four
other countries had e®ects above 3 percent, namely Italy, Spain, Greece, and Ger-
many. Products priced at two euro would have an average gap in in°ation that is
just half of b ¯3, while products priced at 50 cents would have an average in°ation
rate that is twice as big as b ¯3.
As mentioned before, there is no reason to expect that the euro-e®ect has been
constant for the entire post-euro period. While below we allow the post-euro e®ect
to vary over time, there are some reasons to prefer the one-year \pooled" estimate
over more °exible speci¯cations. First, some shops might have reacted faster than
others, and there is no reason to assume that all shops adjusted prices exactly at
the time of the changeover. Second, averaging the e®ect over the whole year 2002
is statistically more conservative, since the estimates are less susceptible to short-
term shocks. We estimated the same model, allowing the post-euro e®ect to last 6
additional months, until June 2003, and the results (not shown) were very similar,
suggesting that the euro \confusion" lasted a long time.13
12Although Luxembourg \neutralizes" this e®ect with a big, negative post-euro constant term
of -2.04, which is why for this country overall in°ation was not very high.
13This fact has been con¯rmed by Eurobarometer surveys carried out in October 2002 and
November 2003. In this last survey, two years after the changeover, 49 percent of consumers still
seem to have di±culties using the new currency.
20A more °exible model has been estimated using time-varying coe±cients, by
simply splitting the post-euro period in \0-4 months after changeover," \4-8 months
after changeover," \8-12 months after changeover," and, ¯nally, \12+ months after
changeover." Tables 7 and 8 show the estimation results of the modi¯ed equation (7)
and (9), respectively. All regressions control for the possibility of an additional e®ect
on the constant term. The ¯rst three columns in both tables show the estimates
of the constant term, while the last three columns show the estimates of ¯1 and ¯3
respectively. There is no clear time pattern. Looking at Table 8, we can notice that
for majority of countries, the estimates for September-October period are smaller
than are those for May-August, which would suggest a decrease in the e®ect.
Summarizing the ¯rst step, there seems to be a strong relationship between the
inverse of prices and in°ation during the post-euro period. The e®ects are not
very big in absolute terms, although they are big in relative terms, since in 2002,
overall in°ation was around 2 percent. Also, in most countries the e®ect seems to
be distributed over the entire year.
The second step of the estimation, based on equation (8), sheds some light on
why the observed euro-related in°ation for low-priced goods varies so much across
the euro countries. Our theoretical model predicts the ¯s to be higher in countries
where consumers have di±culties with the euro, and where the market concentration
is lower.
In order to look at the relationship between market structure and our estimates
of beta, in Figure 3 we plot the D-D estimate of ¯3 from Table 6 against retailer
concentration in the food industry.
As predicted by the model, there is a very strong negative relationship between
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Figure 3: Retailers' concentration and the b ¯3s from Table 6. Notes: Austria (AT), Belgium
(BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT),
Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES).
seem to lie on a straight line. Ireland, though, shows an extremely fast learning
pace. It has, by far, the lowest fractions of consumers who say they have di±culties
remembering and comparing prices (Table 3). Moreover, only 7 percent of Irish
consumers had great di±culties with the euro (the minimum), and only 21 percent
always converted when looking at a price in euros.
We have estimated equation (8) using the estimates of ¯1 from equation (7),
and reported the results in Table 9. The correlation between b ¯1 and the retailer
concentration is around -70 percent (minus the square root of R2). The estimate
is -4 percent, which means that increasing the market concentration from 0.2 to
0.9, that is moving from Italy to Finland, reduces b ¯1 by around 3 percentage points
(4 £ [0:9 ¡ 0:2]).
Finally, we regress b ¯1 on proxies of 1
q0, and their interaction with ´. The two
proxies that are most signi¯cant are consumers' need to convert to the old currency
22(R2 = 0:7), and the fraction of consumers saying that they are uncomfortable with
the euro (R2 = 0:62).14 In both cases, higher 1=q0, that is, higher need to convert
and higher discomfort, are related to higher low-price in°ation. It is interesting
that when dual pricing is available, lower fractions of consumers who look at prices
expressed in both currencies mean lower b ¯1s. It seems that if consumers look only
at the euro price, it does not necessarily mean that they have perfectly learned to
deal with the new currency. All other proxies have the right sign, although they are
not signi¯cant.
We have established that the euro had a positive e®ect on low-priced goods and
that this e®ect depends upon the market concentration and people's di±culty with
dealing with the euro. It seems that people's perception of in°ation depends upon
the same factors. Table 1 shows the fraction of people in di®erent countries who
believes prices were rounded up after the introduction of the euro. These fractions
are generally high, although there is still some variation across countries. Austria,
Finland, and Portugal, for example, have fractions equal or below 80 percent, while
more than 90 percent of consumers in the Netherlands, Greece, Germany, and Spain
believe prices were rounded up after the changeover. The correlation between the
fraction of people who believes prices were rounded up and and b ¯1 is 37 percent.
6 Conclusions
Some institutions, including Eurostat (EUROSTAT 2003), have found that the euro
changeover had only a very limited e®ect on overall in°ation. However, in°ation
is an extremely synthetic measure of price growth and does not capture di®eren-
14The index of conversion summarizes the four di®erent outcomes: always, often, sometimes,
and never convert to the old currency. The higher the index, the more consumers convert prices
into the old currency.
23tiated e®ects of the changeover on prices. To our knowledge, excluding anecdotal
evidence and descriptive studies, these possible di®erentiated e®ects have not been
fully investigated.
We propose a model in which consumers are fully rational, but after a cash
changeover they remember and compare prices with some noise. The model predicts
higher in°ation for lower-priced goods. It also predicts that the e®ect is lower
in less-concentrated markets, where some retailers gain from competing in \price
transparency." We analyze the relationship between price levels and in°ation in all
12 EU countries that introduced the new currency and in three EU countries that
did not. We ¯nd that in the eurozone prices of cheap goods rose faster than prices
of expensive goods, compared to other EU countries. We link this result to the
level of retailer concentration, and to the di±culties euro consumers had due to the
changeover.
The analysis sheds some light on what happened after January 2002. Hopefully,
it also will help some countries (especially future euro members) with designing
better currency changeovers and with predict their e®ects. Three countries that
have been used as a comparison group, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden,
have a retailer concentration of, respectively, 0.57, 0.76, and 0.95. Using our results,
the predicted in°ation rate due to changeover, would be inversely proportional to
the level of prices by a factor of 1 percent for Sweden, 2 percent for Denmark, and 3
percent for United Kingdom. Enhancing price transparency, educating consumers,
and some sort of \price watch," especially among smaller shops, are some of the
measures that countries facing a currency change may want to adopt.
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26A Main data sources
Eurostat's HICP: The consumer price index is a measure of the general relative
change of the prices of goods and services used by households for private
consumption. In order to measure just the price change, weights are ¯xed
over time (Laspeyres-type index, EUROSTAT (December 2001)). These data
contain information on 93 di®erent aggregated items. We use the monthly
price indices from January 1997 to December 2002.
Economist Intelligence Unit: The EIU collects, on a yearly basis, the prices of
several goods in several cities from around the world. The EIU researchers
collect information about prices twice a year (EIU n.d.). Survey prices are
gathered and listed from three types of stores: supermarkets, medium-priced
retailers, and more expensive specialty shops. Only outlets, where items of
internationally comparable quality are available for normal sale, are visited.
The statistical design is weak, but the purpose of these data is just to classify
products based on their approximate price level. The information from the EIU
is then used by averaging over items and cities every time prices for multiple
items and/or cities match one item from the Eurostat data. This procedure
attenuates possible measurement errors. As a speci¯cation check, the models
have been estimated using price averages over the entire time period available,
and results were very similar.
The match: The time frequency and the items covered do not perfectly match.
Table 10 brie°y depicts these limits. We manage to combine 46 items from the
Eurostat data (50 percent) with prices in levels from the EIU data. Table 11
shows these items with the corresponding average price.
27Eurobarometer: This survey is based on approximately 1000 interviews per mem-
ber state. The 2002 survey mostly covers issues related to the introduction of
the euro. Information extracted from this source always uses the appropriate
sample weights.
Retailer concentration: The data has been taken from an internal working paper







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 2: Euro countries and their exchange rates with the euro.
Country Exchange Rate approx. error
Belgium 40.34 40 0.8%
Germany 1.96 2 -2.2%
Greece 340.75 350 {2.6%
Spain 166.39 166.67 -0.2%
France 6.56 6.67 -1.7%
Ireland 0.79 0.8 -1.6%
Italy 1936.27 2000 -3.2%
Luxembourg 40.34 40 0.8%
The Netherlands 2.20 2.2 0.2%
Austria 13.76 14 -1.7%
Portugal 200.48 200 0.2%
Finland 5.95 6 -0.9%
The approximation errors are based on a study conducted by an Italian

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 4: Weighted OLS regressions of age and education.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education Education Age Age
Only look at euro -0.408 -0.415 -0.121 -0.653
(0.121)** (0.117)** (0.566) (0.546)
Only look at old currency -0.171 -0.250 -1.229 -1.452
(0.114) (0.107)* (0.557)* (0.524)**
Need to convert -0.055 0.002 0.884 0.812
(0.046) (0.043) (0.218)** (0.207)**
Uncomfortable with euro -1.326 -1.009 4.924 3.194
(0.100)** (0.094)** (0.495)** (0.473)**
Dual pricing is essential -0.604 -0.445 2.476 1.688
(0.103)** (0.097)** (0.499)** (0.470)**
Di±cult to remember prices -0.252 -0.106 2.266 1.937
(0.108)* (0.102) (0.507)** (0.479)**
Di±cult to compare prices -0.365 -0.243 1.883 1.407
(0.109)** (0.103)* (0.508)** (0.481)**
Di®cult to use coins -0.425 -0.016 6.345 5.790
(0.098)** (0.094) (0.473)** (0.450)**
Belgium -0.025 0.041 1.016 0.984
(0.159) (0.156) (0.862) (0.837)
Finland 1.783 1.897 1.773 4.098
(0.203)** (0.200)** (0.874)* (0.867)**
France 0.540 0.350 -2.951 -2.247
(0.164)** (0.162)* (0.864)** (0.845)**
Germany 0.127 0.183 0.873 1.039
(0.152) (0.152) (0.746) (0.739)
Greece -1.167 -1.007 2.476 0.954
(0.192)** (0.181)** (0.857)** (0.811)
Ireland -0.618 -0.636 -0.272 -1.079
(0.155)** (0.153)** (0.906) (0.882)
Italy -0.400 -0.246 2.385 1.863
(0.197)* (0.191) (0.855)** (0.832)*
Luxembourg 0.957 1.092 2.090 3.338
(0.252)** (0.233)** (1.062)* (0.973)**
The Netherlands 0.978 0.968 -0.159 1.117
(0.197)** (0.187)** (0.994) (0.951)
Portugal -3.751 -3.745 0.088 -4.803
(0.194)** (0.182)** (0.854) (0.816)**
Spain -1.713 -1.714 -0.019 -2.253





Constant 12.118 14.445 36.099 51.902
(0.170)** (0.180)** (0.828)** (0.969)**
Observations 10704 10704 10704 10704
R-squared 0.15 0.22 0.10 0.17
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. \*" indicates a signi¯cance level of 10 percent,
\**" one of 5 percent. Source: Authors' calculations based on the Eurobarometer
32Table 5: OLS estimates of annual price growth (100 £ [pt=pt¡12 ¡ 1]) on 1=p, using one
year after the changeover (01/97-12/02).
Without constant With constant
¯0 °1 = 0, ¯1 °1 ¯1 Obs.
Euro countries:
Austria 0.14 -0.99 -0.11 -0.81 2556
(0.26) (0.48)** (0.12) (0.49) *
Belgium -0.03 -0.09 0.19 -0.37 2534
(0.33) (0.63) (0.18) (0.64)
Germany -0.04 0.31 -0.13 0.51 2629
(0.26) (0.47) (0.17) (0.49)
Spain -0.36 1.98 0.67 1.18 2400
(0.21) * (0.48)** (0.11)** (0.42)**
Finland 0.05 -0.50 0.17 -0.82 2616
(0.37) (0.91) (0.17) (0.97)
France -0.07 0.60 0.82 -0.71 2628
(0.29) (0.53) (0.10)** (0.51)
Greece -0.33 1.37 0.37 0.93 2339
(0.37) (0.84) (0.53) (1.07)
Ireland 0.05 -0.58 0.45 -1.32 2460
(0.36) (0.47) (0.16)** (0.55)**
Italy -0.38 1.98 0.31 1.54 2544
(0.15)** (0.39)** (0.15)** (0.47)**
Luxembourg -0.02 0.05 -1.20 1.57 2544
(0.30) (0.57) (0.28)** (0.51)**
The Netherlands -0.23 1.24 0.85 0.02 2518
(0.27) (0.49)** (0.15)** (0.52)
Portugal -0.14 0.94 0.29 0.61 2484
(0.25) (0.43)** (0.14)** (0.44)
Non-euro countries:
Denmark 0.21 -1.42 0.55 -2.53 2340
(0.38) (0.72)** (0.19)** (0.86)**
Sweden 0.27 -1.20 0.94 -2.86 2460
(0.38) (0.86) (0.22)** (0.79)**
The United Kingdom 0.35 -1.99 0.00 -2.00 2460
(0.26) (0.52)** (0.14) (0.55)**
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for heterogeneity over time and goods, and dependence over goods,
by clustering the 46 items into 13 di®erent homogenous groups (Appendix A). \*" indicates a signi¯cance level of
10 percent, \**" one of 5 percent.
33Table 6: Di®erence-in-di®erence estimates (one but last column) of deseasonalized and
detrended annual price growth (100 £ [pt=pt¡12 ¡ 1]) on 1=p.
Constant term Inverse of price 1=p
°0 °1 °2 ¯0 ¯2 ¯1 ¯3
Austria 0.04 0.50 -0.65 0.28 -0.20 -2.42 1.67
(0.08) (0.11)** (0.17)** (0.26) (0.28) (0.55)** (0.46)**
Belgium -0.03 0.50 -0.27 0.28 -0.26 -2.42 2.01
(0.11) (0.11)** (0.20) (0.26) (0.26) (0.55)** (0.49)**
Germany 0.11 0.50 -0.74 0.28 -0.47 -2.42 3.08
(0.12) (0.11)** (0.21)** (0.26) (0.26) * (0.55)** (0.51)**
Spain -0.18 0.50 0.36 0.28 -0.45 -2.42 3.42
(0.08)** (0.11)** (0.15)** (0.26) (0.22)** (0.55)** (0.39)**
Finland -0.02 0.50 -0.30 0.28 -0.19 -2.42 1.56
(0.08) (0.11)** (0.19) (0.26) (0.26) (0.55)** (0.64)**
France -0.22 0.50 0.55 0.28 -0.01 -2.42 1.37
(0.08)** (0.11)** (0.15)** (0.26) (0.23) (0.55)** (0.43)**
Greece -0.06 0.50 -0.06 0.28 -0.54 -2.42 3.29
(0.59) (0.11)** (0.80) (0.26) (0.81) (0.55)** (1.19)**
Ireland -0.10 0.50 0.06 0.28 -0.07 -2.42 0.95
(0.10) (0.11)** (0.19) (0.26) (0.37) (0.55)** (0.67)
Italy -0.08 0.50 -0.10 0.28 -0.55 -2.42 3.86
(0.08) (0.11)** (0.20) (0.26) (0.21)** (0.55)** (0.47)**
Luxembourg 0.34 0.50 -2.04 0.28 -0.73 -2.42 4.43
(0.19) * (0.11)** (0.35)** (0.26) (0.36)** (0.55)** (0.55)**
The Netherlands -0.23 0.50 0.59 0.28 -0.22 -2.42 2.15
(0.13) * (0.11)** (0.20)** (0.26) (0.23) (0.55)** (0.39)**
Portugal -0.10 0.50 -0.10 0.28 -0.32 -2.42 2.93
(0.10) (0.11)** (0.19) (0.26) (0.25) (0.55)** (0.53)**
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for heterogeneity over time and goods, and dependence over goods,
by clustering the 46 items into 13 di®erent homogenous groups (Appendix A). \*" indicates a signi¯cance level of
10 percent, \**" one of 5 percent.
34Table 7: OLS estimates of deseasonalized and detrended annual price growth (100 £
[pt=pt¡12 ¡ 1]) on 1=p, over the whole period (01/97-6/03) and after the euro was intro-
duced, using time-varying coe±cients.
Constant term 2002 Inverse of price 1=p 2002
Jan-Apr May-Aug Sep-Oct Jan-Apr May-Aug Sep-Oct
Euro countries:
Austria 0.23 -0.30 -0.26 -0.61 -1.59 -0.24
(0.17) (0.21) (0.18) (0.94) (0.76)** (0.45)
Belgium 0.87 0.27 -0.57 0.57 -1.60 -0.07
(0.22)** (0.30) (0.29)** (1.14) (0.88) * (0.62)
Germany 0.56 -0.25 -0.71 0.58 -0.48 1.43
(0.26)** (0.27) (0.26)** (0.77) (0.78) (0.53)**
Spain 0.83 0.66 0.53 0.41 0.99 2.15
(0.22)** (0.19)** (0.14)** (0.78) (0.69) (0.44)**
Finland 0.51 0.33 -0.32 0.48 -2.10 -0.84
(0.28) * (0.33) (0.24) (2.00) (1.52) (0.72)
France 1.15 0.74 0.57 -0.17 -1.86 -0.09
(0.16)** (0.14)** (0.18)** (0.84) (0.93)** (0.44)
Greece -1.08 1.34 0.85 3.87 -1.43 0.37
(1.57) (0.28)** (0.16)** (2.82) (1.00) (0.65)
Ireland 1.37 0.54 -0.54 -2.83 -1.99 0.85
(0.22)** (0.25)** (0.21)** (0.65)** (0.69)** (0.73)
Italy 0.32 0.20 0.41 1.98 1.28 1.37
(0.32) (0.25) (0.19)** (0.95)** (0.86) (0.43)**
Luxembourg -0.79 -1.15 -1.68 1.09 1.07 2.56
(0.41) * (0.42)** (0.57)** (0.67) (0.81) (0.67)**
The Netherlands 1.40 0.90 0.26 0.00 -0.65 0.71
(0.26)** (0.26)** (0.22) (1.02) (0.73) (0.45)
Portugal 0.20 0.07 0.60 1.73 0.48 -0.37
(0.19) (0.27) (0.23)** (0.69)** (0.58) (0.58)
Non-euro countries:
Denmark 0.49 0.62 0.54 -2.41 -4.02 -1.14
(0.26) * (0.33) * (0.36) (1.60) (1.37)** (0.97)
Sweden 1.36 0.94 0.54 -2.26 -3.95 -2.36
(0.44)** (0.33)** (0.30) * (1.48) (1.21)** (0.79)**
The United Kingdom 0.30 -0.18 -0.10 -1.12 -3.11 -1.77
(0.25) (0.25) (0.21) (1.04) (0.79)** (0.54)**
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for heterogeneity over time and goods, and dependence over goods,
by clustering the 46 items into 13 di®erent homogenous groups (Appendix A). \*" indicates a signi¯cance level of
10 percent, \**" one of 5 percent.
35Table 8: Di®erence-in-di®erence estimates of deseasonalized and detrended annual price
growth (100 £ [pt=pt¡12 ¡ 1]) on 1=p, using time varying coe±cients.
Constant term 2002 Inverse of price 1=p 2002
Jan-Apr May-Aug Sep-Oct Jan-Apr May-Aug Sep-Oct
Austria -0.50 -0.80 -0.64 1.24 2.11 1.66
(0.30) * (0.26)** (0.26)** (0.72) * (0.78)** (0.52)**
Belgium 0.22 -0.15 -0.88 2.31 1.99 1.73
(0.21) (0.35) (0.35)** (0.59)** (0.79)** (0.70)**
Germany -0.24 -0.82 -1.16 2.52 3.31 3.42
(0.33) (0.32)** (0.32)** (0.81)** (0.90)** (0.64)**
Spain 0.32 0.38 0.37 2.01 4.44 3.80
(0.20) (0.25) (0.23) (0.62)** (0.53)** (0.52)**
Finland -0.16 -0.10 -0.64 2.23 1.49 0.96
(0.24) (0.35) (0.33)** (1.09)** (1.10) (0.77)
France 0.68 0.50 0.45 1.27 1.43 1.41
(0.24)** (0.22)** (0.26) * (0.58)** (0.91) (0.51)**
Greece -1.71 0.95 0.57 5.59 2.14 2.14
(1.69) (0.67) (0.63) (2.61)** (1.28) * (1.02)**
Ireland 0.78 0.18 -0.79 -1.19 1.50 2.54
(0.28)** (0.30) (0.29)** (1.11) (1.00) (0.83)**
Italy -0.29 -0.18 0.15 3.66 4.81 3.11
(0.39) (0.30) (0.29) (0.79)** (0.77)** (0.61)**
Luxembourg -1.81 -1.94 -2.36 3.31 5.14 4.83
(0.52)** (0.50)** (0.60)** (0.87)** (0.68)** (0.72)**
The Netherlands 0.94 0.67 0.14 1.49 2.69 2.25
(0.33)** (0.29)** (0.28) (0.68)** (0.61)** (0.50)**
Portugal -0.39 -0.28 0.36 3.42 4.02 1.37
(0.29) (0.31) (0.28) (0.70)** (1.01)** (0.73) *
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) allow for heterogeneity over time and goods, and dependence over goods,
by clustering the 46 items into 13 di®erent homogenous groups (Appendix A). \*" indicates a signi¯cance level of

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 10: Data sources
Data Eurostat EIU Consumer Survey Eurobarometer
Type panel panel panel cross-sec.
Frequency monthly yearly monthly -
Time spanned 1/97-12/02 90-03 1/85-11/03 4/2002
Countries 17 15 17 12
# of items 94 303 | {z } - -
# items matched 46 - -
Table 11: Matched HICP-items and EIU identi¯cation code. Mean and standard deviation
of prices in euro.
Eurostat EIU mean sd #obs group
Bread and cereals fwbs fwbm fcfs fcfm 2.4 0.76 210 1
Meat ®ms-fcwm 12.5 2.94 210 1
Fish and seafood ®fs-±m 12.1 3.56 210 1
Milk,cheese and eggs fmks fmkm fchs fchm fegs fegm 3.4 0.88 210 1
Oils and fats fbus-fmgm foos-fpcm 3.9 1.23 210 1
Fruit fors-fbnm 1.9 0.51 210 1
Vegetables fpts-fcrm °ts °tm 1.9 0.6 210 1
Sugar,jam,honey,chocolate and conf. fsus fsum 1.2 0.26 210 1
Co®ee,tea and cocoa ¯cs-fdcm 3.4 0.62 210 2
Mineral waters,soft drinks, juices fcos-fojm 1 0.25 210 2
Spirits asws-alcm 19.7 8.06 210 2
Wine awcs-awfm 15.1 6.75 210 2
Beer abls-abtm 1.6 0.67 210 2
Tobacco tcms-tpto 3.6 1.24 210 2
Clothing materials csws cswm 10.9 2.8 210 3
Garments cbsc-cmtm cddc cddm cwcc-ccjm cgdc-cbtm 81.6 16.07 210 3
Cleaning,repair and hire of clothing hlas-hdtm 7.7 2.48 210 3
Footwear incl repair cmsc cmsm cwsc cwsm 130.3 27.68 210 3
Actual rentals for housing rf1m-ru3h rf3m-ruh3 1,484 424 210 3
Maintenance and repair of dwelling hlds-hdlm hlbs hlbm 4.3 0.96 210 3
Water supply uwmb 39.5 14.92 197 3
Electricity uemb 118 61.24 210 3
Gas ugmb 89 42.18 183 3
Heat energy uhto 45.2 18.67 178 3
Major household appliances rctv rnfp hfps-hetm 291.7 94.36 210 3
Non-durable household goods hsps-hspm hiks hikm hbts hbtm 3.4 1.16 210 4
Domestic services and household services dhdc dhbr 9.8 5.5 210 5
Pharmaceutical products pcas pcam 10.2 4.34 210 6
Medical services; paramedical services icgp 64.6 48.51 150 6
Dental services icdt 98.7 42.94 150 6
Hospital services ixgp 64.5 27.23 150 6
Motor cars tcll-tcfh 23,531 6124 210 6
Fuels and lubricants for transport trup 1 0.16 210 6
Maintenance and repair of transport equip. ttul ttuh 217.5 62.56 210 6
Passenger transport by road ttrk ttim ttac 12 5.14 210 6
Telephone and telefax services utlr 14.5 4.92 202 7
Recording media rdcp 19.1 6.99 209 8
Cultural services rtfp rcfp 131.7 57.55 210 9
Books rpbn 11.5 2.59 209 10
Newspapers and periodicals rdln 0.9 0.31 210 10
Restaurants,cafs and the like bmtp b®s 84.5 32.4 210 1
Canteens bdrb 9.9 3.33 210 1
Accommodation services bhth bmht 208 52.74 210 1
Hairdressing salons pcmh pcwh 36.3 11.93 210 12
Other personal e®ects pcts-pclm pcrs pcrm 6.3 0.87 210 14
Insurance connected with transport tcil tcih 1,618 553 210 14
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